Public procurement is a crucial activity undertaken by the public sector. However, public procurement entails a wide range of transaction costs. While many papers focus on the ex-ante transaction costs, it is equally important to evaluate the types of ex-post transaction costs. Th e disputes stemming from confl icts between procuring authorities and proposers oft en bring additional costs to both parties. One of the ways to ensure that the procuring authority wins the dispute is using the services of an external law fi rm to represent the procuring authority in the review process. Th e aim of the paper is to examine the extent of the use of external law services in the public-procurement review process by procuring authorities and proposers in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic. Th e focus is also on the impact the use of external law fi rms in the review process may have on the length of the review process and the outcome of the dispute. Our results suggest that while the use of the external law fi rm may lead to a higher success rate of the review process on the side of a procuring authority, the same does not apply to proposers. Th ere were no conclusive fi ndings regarding the impact of the outsourcing on the length of the review process.
Introduction
Public-procurement cost evaluation is considered to be important for both the public and the private sectors. From the private-sector perspective, the procurement optimisation at the company level is rational. On the public-sector side, the measurement of the transaction costs as part of the evaluation of the regulatory system is also rational. Th e reduction of these costs can lead to several macroeconomic benefi ts, such as the decrease of public debt from the point of view of public institutions. Th ere are several studies focused on the impact of macroeconomic indicators on public debt (e.g. Knapkova et al. 2019) . Ex-post transaction costs for both the public and the private sectors include expenses spent on the services of external law fi rms in the review process as public procurement itself.
Th e main reason contracting authorities may decide to use the outsourcing of procurement administration instead of handling the administration in-house is that the procurer does not have the institutional capacity to handle procurement. Th is means that the contracting authority may not have suffi cient expertise in the area of public procurement needed to prepare a high-quality tender. Komakech (2016) emphasises the unique skillset public-procurement professionals should possess. It is crucial for procurement specialists to have contract-management skills, knowledge of public-procurement regulations and other skills. However, the contracting authority does not always have such a professional at their disposal in-house. Th us, they appoint an external expert to execute the tender process for them (European Commission 2017) . Th e use of procurement agents provides several benefi ts, such as:
• the procurement agents minimise information asymmetry, • they reduce risks, • they provide professionalism, • they contribute to the advancement of international practices (Asian Development Bank 2013).
However, even though the use of an external fi rm has many benefi ts, it also brings several risks, such as:
• violation of the competition law, • violation of the public procurement law, • confl ict of interest or other types of fraud (European Commission 2017).
Even though the use of an external procurement agent may aff ect the outcome of the public procurement, there has not been a lot of research in this fi eld of study. One of the few studies focused on this issue was conducted by Placek et al. (2019b) , who studied the impact of several factors on the length of the award procedure in the Czech Republic. Among these factors, they also examined the eff ect of outsourcing the administration of the tender. Th ey found that the use of outsourcing of administration in the process of public procurement shortens the tender process by 6 days on average. Th us, it seems like the use of external experts may be a crucial factor of the procurement procedure.
In our paper, the main focus is on the use of procurement agents in the area of the public-procurement review process. Th e tenderers tend to fi le a complaint if the tendering documents are not comprehensible and therefore prevent them from preparing a tender or if the tenderers were unfairly excluded from the competition. Complaints may lead to corrections of the mistake by the award offi ce as well as to the maintenance of the legal protection from a procedural point of view (Meyer-Hofmann 2012) . Complaint and appeal mechanisms are crucial to detecting bribery, fraud and corruption and the appropriate system of public procurement review is an eff ective tool used to achieve transparency, honesty and equal competition (Patraş 2016; Tvaronavičiene et al. 2016 ).
However, disputes stemming from the procurement process lead to a waste of valuable resources, such as time and increased transaction costs for contractors and procuring authorities. In the case of a dispute, the procurement process must be postponed until the decision is carried out, which could lead to severe time delays and an additional increase of transaction costs. Th e disputes also lead to fi nancial costs, such as penalties and compensation for economic losses (Ko and Liao 2013) . Th e OECD (2000) also states that the number of complaints should not be used as a measure of effi ciency of the remedies system, since few complaints may stem from good compliance as well as from the fact that tenderers may be afraid to start a dispute out of fear of future repercussions. In the case of the Czech Republic the number of complaints decreased signifi cantly from 2016 to 2017 (to 50 %) due to the extreme increase of bail the complainant has to deposit on the review authority bank account (according to new procurement law No. 134 / 2016 Coll.) .
Th e aim of the paper is to examine the extent of the use of external law services in the public procurement review process by procuring authorities and proposers in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic. Th e focus is also on the impact the use of external law fi rms in the review process may have on the length of the review process and the outcome of the dispute.
Literature review
Th e idea of transaction costs was brought into the analysis of economic behaviour by R. H. Coase (1937) . He showed that transaction costs play a critical role in fi rms' origin, because they are hierarchical organisations saving costs of market transactions. He considered them to be a reason for the origin of fi rms, to operate on the lower level of transaction costs compared to the market arrangements. Th e relation of the transaction costs to the public sector was then broadly analysed by Coase's follower Williamson (1981) . Akerlof (1970) described transaction costs as "dishonesty" costs. He illustrated the dishonesty of doing business in less developed countries, which is more diffi cult because of the high level of distrust causing the transaction costs to rise. Th ere are higher transaction costs not only in the private business sphere, but the situation of distrust induces the higher transaction costs in public procurement as well, linked to public procurement preparation, contract creation and the post-contracting behaviour of the suppliers.
Th e comprehensive foreign research of the correlation between transaction costs and opportunistic behaviour was provided, e.g., by Hill (1990) . Th e study on incentives and transaction costs in public procurement based on microdata from Russia (Balaeva et al. 2018) reported that the average overall costs of public procurements in Russia came in at about 1 % of the total value of concluded contracts, but with a quite diff erent amount (6.6 to 8.1 %) for small purchases.
An interesting broader approach to regulation, the reform of public utilities, and the complex problems of governance based on Williamson's transaction costs approach was provided by Tadelis (2009 Tadelis ( , 2012 .
Th e infl uence of the transaction costs in the pre-contracting (ex-ante) phase is broadly analysed mainly in Potoski (2002, 2003) . Th ey concluded that the key factors causing the rise of the external production transaction costs are both the low measurability of outputs (outcomes) and an assets specifi city (highly specifi c assets usually lead to the monopsony dependence of the contractor on the supplier). Bajari and Tadelis (2001) reported on the dependency between the decision / selection criteria and transaction costs in the case of building public procurements. Th e higher tendency of contractors towards lower transaction costs ex ante may signifi cantly increase on-going and ex-post transaction costs. Th e other important factors are price design (fi xed price or surcharge to the proven costs) and the project characteristics (simple reparation compared to a comprehensive complex project with a high uncertainty level).
Th e European Commission (2011) elaborated a very comprehensive study (and probably the most comprehensive of all) on the public procurement transaction costs. From 7,300 inquiries they reported that the total transaction costs of the public procurement in the EU are 1.4 % of the contract value and the main part (3 / 4) of this cost is borne by the private sector.
In the Czech and Slovak literature, the problem of the transaction costs in public procurement is systematically tested and investigated by Pavel (2007 Pavel ( , 2013 Pavel ( , 2018 . He defi ned transaction costs related to the public procurement as costs bonded with the given contract realisation besides the production costs (2007) . He also divides transaction costs in terms of time to: (i) preliminary, (ii) current, (iii) consecutive. According to this author, transaction costs are incurred by both public and private sectors in the process of public procurement. Source: own design, based mainly on Pavel and Vitek (2016) In 2009 Pavel and Sicakova-Beblava brought evidence from the Czech and Slovak municipalities that the measurability of the contract outcomes is usually considered by the municipalities, but the assets specifi city is not. Pavel (2013) concluded that the ex-ante transaction costs of projects supported by the Czech Operational Programme Environment are 0.72 % of the contract value on average.
According to the European Commission (2016), the public procurement market size was 14 % of GDP in the Czech Republic (the same part as in the UK). Th is represents approximately 26.5 bil. EUR in the Czech Republic.
In Pavel and Vitek (2016) the transaction costs on the side of the public sector and the direct transaction costs on the side of private fi rms are estimated with rather pessimistic fi ndings. Th ey estimated that these two (out of more) categories of transaction costs represent about 1.5 % of GDP (approximately 3 bil. EUR) -this equals the estimated savings (diff erence between estimated and contractual price). Plaček et al. (2016) . Th ey show that the probability of review procedures is relatively high in the Czech Republic -almost 1.5 % of all open tenders are subject to revisions by the regulator (Offi ce for Protection of the Competition). Th e total amount of fees by the regulator for procurement mistakes was 72 million CZK (almost 3 million EUR) in 2014, and the total amount of fi nancial cautions from fi rms (cautions are necessary to start the revision procedure by the regulator) was 130 million CZK. Th e relatively very high percentage (20 %) of complaints were confi rmed by the regulator as appropriate. Together with the relatively high proportion of cancelled tenders it causes the direct and indirect costs increase and the ineff ective resource allocation on both the public and private sector sides, having a very negative impact on the procurement system at the end.
Support for the very high level of indirect transaction costs was provided by
Th ere are only rare additional attempts to measure the volume of the public procurement transaction costs in the domestic area. Man et al. (2014) estimated the ex-ante public sector transaction costs at 1.8 % of the contract value. Dufek (2013) attempted to specify the average transaction costs of one proposal on the level of 2,489 CZK, the weighted average relative transaction costs at 0.25 % of the contract value and the total transaction costs of public procurement in the Czech Republic on the level of 6 billion CZK. In Šumpikova et al. (2016) the private sector transaction costs in the public procurement process are estimated on the basis of 47 private building companies. Th ey show that the rate of the bid-preparation transaction cost compared to the total value of the contract is likely related to the company size. Micro fi rms estimated the rate below 5 %, while big companies around 15 %. Grega and Nemec (2015) stated that the impact of competitiveness on the results of the public procurement is very important in Slovakia. Besides that, they also proved the high importance of the usage of the lowest-price criteria and the EU funds co-fi nancing in the fi nal procurement price setting.
Authors in Mikušová Meričková and Nemec (2013) examine a link between contracting performance and the quality of contract management in Slovakia. Th ey concluded that contracting does not always produce the expected positive results. Th ey bring the evidence that a key factor determining success in contraction is competitive selection, but non-competitive selection of suppliers prevails in Slovakia.
Interesting fi ndings based on the comprehensive research were provided by Grega et al. (2019) on Slovak data. According to this paper, there is signifi cant agreement between suppliers and contractors that the two main factors causing ineffi ciencies are excessive bureaucracy and corruption or other ethical shortcomings. It is shown that insuffi cient competition, and the excessive use of the lowest price criterion for selecting winning bids, add further ineffi ciencies. Savings are greatest when there are between 6 and 8 bidders. E-auctions generally produce larger savings than more traditional methods, but Slovak procurement procedures are costly, compared to most other EU states.
Plaček et al. (2019a) analysed the factors infl uencing time delays in the awarding of public sector contracts in the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom. Th ey tested a bias between time delays and (H1) the type of contracting authority, (H2) the estimated value of public contract, (H3) the type of procurement procedures and (H4) the choice of the bid evaluation criterion. Although there are no direct transaction costs calculations and H4 was rejected for the UK, the paper shows that almost all tested factors signifi cantly infl uence the length of procurement procedure and thus the transaction costs. Tvaronavičiene et al. (2016) state that even though the Review Directive (Directive 2007 / 66 / EC) sets the main requirement for the public procurement disputes resolution system for the EU member states, each country has its own system for public procurement review. Even though these diff erences help each country to retain discretion, it also prevents equal competition in the market. Th us, it is diffi cult to compare the review systems of two diff erent EU countries (such as Slovakia and the Czech Republic), considering their diff erences. However, in this paper, we will try to compare the transaction costs stemming from public procurement reviews of these two countries, while pointing out their diff erences.
Th is paper deals with the transaction costs of the public procurement arisen from the public procurement reviews. Th e correctness of the public procurement assignment is reviewed by the Offi ce for the Protection of the Competition in the Czech Republic and the Offi ce of Public Procurement in Slovakia. Th e analysis focuses on two selected aspects of the public procurement review transaction costs, namely on the length and outcomes of the review in connection to participation of the external law fi rms in the review process. We try to fi nd out whether it is rational to hire external law fi rms to accelerate the review process and to ensure the positive outcome. Th e law fi rms' services will probably be costlier than in-house staff work, so the rationalisation of this strategy may consist in decreasing or even eliminating the dispute for contractors.
Methodology, data and methods used in the paper
Th e analysis conducted within the paper is focused on various aspects of the review process of public procurement in Slovakia and the Czech Republic with the emphasis on the use of external legal services by the procuring authority and the proposer within the review process. Our focus is on the review process in these countries in the two most recent concluded periods -the years 2017 and 2018. Th e data for the Czech Republic was obtained from the Offi ce for the Protection of the Competition in the Czech Republic, while the data for Slovakia was obtained from the Offi ce of Public Procurement in Slovakia. As we discussed in the previous text, the review systems work diff erently in various countries, even within the European Union. Th us, it is crucial to specify the similarities and diff erences of review systems in Slovakia and the Czech Republic.
In the Czech Republic, the review decisions are published in the form of qualitative data on the Offi ce website in a pdf format, but their texts are unstructured. More than 11.5 thousand decisions are available in this way. Th us, specifi c data mining is needed to get any statistically tested data. We tried to prepare a full-text search programme, but it is more complicated and time-demanding than we expected. For that reason, we decided to manually mine data from randomly selected sample of 70 outsourced and 70 non-outsourced decisions from the years 2017 and 2018. Considering the smaller size of Slovakia in comparison to the Czech Republic, it is understandable that the number of complaints proposed each year is smaller in Slovakia. Th erefore, even though we used the random sample of 140 reviews for each year under review in the Czech Republic, we decided to analyse all decisions made by the Offi ce of Public Procurement in Slovakia in 2017 and 2018.
In both countries under review, both the procuring authority and the proposer (complainant) can outsource the review process to an external legal fi rm. Even though procuring authorities use this option fairly oft en in both countries, the proposers use outsourcing more frequently in the Czech Republic. Th erefore, some diff erences in methodology are used when comparing the review process of Slovakia and the Czech Republic. While in Slovakia, we only focus on the external representation of the procuring authority (stemming from the fact that there were very few cases where it was specifi cally stated that the proposer outsourced the legal services to an external fi rm -specifi cally in two cases in 2017 and in three cases in 2018), in the Czech Republic we compare the use of external experts on both sides, the procuring authority and the proposer, as well. It is therefore important to point out that the outsourced reviews in the Czech Republic refer to outsourcing by either the procuring authority or the proposer. Th is means that the non-outsourced decisions were not outsourced by either party, while the outsourced decisions may have been outsourced by the procuring authority, the proposers or both at the same time. However, outsourced reviews in Slovakia only refer to the outsourcing of the legal services by the procuring authority.
Th e diff erences in the methodology stemming from the diff erences between the review systems of Slovakia and the Czech Republic are summarised in the following table. Th e acquired qualitative data was transformed into quantitative date, and it was statistically tested whether there are some relations or not at all. Th e main variables analysed within the paper are the use of an external legal fi rm by a procur-ing authority (and / or by a proposer in case of the Czech Republic) in the review process, the use of an external legal fi rm by a procuring authority in the process of preparation of a public procurement tender, the length of the review process and the outcome of the review process. Note: number of decisions analysed within the paper is denoted in parentheses (.) Source: authors. Table 3 shows the total number of review decisions made in Slovakia and the Czech Republic in 2017 and 2018. Th e aggregate numbers are provided to determine the share of outsourced reviews on the total number of reviews made in a country. However, the subsequent research is focused on the analysis of a random selection of reviews in the Czech Republic and all reviews in Slovakia (with the exception of 2 reviews in 2017 and 3 reviews in 2018 for which the data was not available and thus could not be evaluated).
Even though the analysis is focused on several variables, an emphasis is put on the impact of the use of an external law fi rm to represent one of the parties in the outcome of the review process. Th ere is a variety of decisions a supervisory authority can make to resolve a dispute between the proposer and the procuring authority in both Slovakia and the Czech Republic. For the purposes of this paper, we decided to divide these decisions into two categories: decisions favourable to a proposer and decisions favourable to a procuring authority. We realise that this distinction oversimplifi es the range of decisions made by a supervisory authority, but this approach allows us to compare the impact the outsourcing of legal services has on the outcome of the review process in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic. Cases "won" by a procuring authority in our analysis include decisions made in favour of a procuring authority by the supervisory authority as well as cases in which the proposer gave up his claims or did not submit the required documents. Cases "won" by a proposer include decisions made in favour of a proposer by the supervisory authority as well as cases in which a procuring authority decided to revoke the public procurement altogether before the decision could be carried out.
Research Results and Their Discussion
Th e use of an external law fi rm is usually costlier than using in-house employees to take care of obligations stemming from the public procurement review process. However, since the contracting authorities as well as proposers use these services, this strategy should be rational if its use reduces the probability of losing a dispute or shortens the length of the review process.
Based on the abovementioned assumptions, two hypotheses were formulated: H1: Th e use of the services of an external law fi rm by the contracting authority increases the likelihood that the review of the contract will end in favour of the contracting authority.
H2: Th e use of services of an external law fi rm leads to a shortened review period. Th e use of an external law fi rm to represent one of the interested parties is much more pronounced in the Czech Republic. While less than a quarter of all reviews were outsourced in Slovakia in 2017 (and even fewer in 2018), this share was above 60 % in both 2017 and 2018 in the Czech Republic. Th ere are several reasons that could explain this situation. First of all, documents published by the Slovak Offi ce for Public Procurement do not specifi cally state when a proposer uses an external law representative in the review process. Th erefore, we can only evaluate the number of reviews outsourced by the procuring authority, while the number for the Czech Republic is an aggregate of the outsourcing by both the procuring authority and the proposer. Th e higher share of outsourced reviews in the Czech Republic may also stem from the diff erences between the review systems in Slovakia and the Czech Republic.
While in Slovakia, we can only evaluate the outsourcing used by a procuring authority, in the Czech Republic, we can also compare the use of external law services by both procuring authorities and proposers. It is clear that the outsourcing of the public procurement review process in the Czech Republic is much more common on the side of the proposer. More than 35 % of the proposers used the services of an external law fi rm in both years under review, while this share was only 10 % for the procuring authorities. In roughly 13 % of all analysed cases, both parties decided to use an external law fi rm. We can also see that while there is a slight decrease in the use of outsourcing in Slovakia, these numbers are very consistent in the two monitored years in the Czech Republic, and there is not an obvious increase or decrease of outsourcing. It is apparent that the review process, regardless of whether it is outsourced to an external law fi rm or not, takes longer in Slovakia. While the average time of the review process in Slovakia was above 140 days (147 days in 2017 and 140 days in 2018), the average length was much shorter in the Czech Republic (50 days in 2017 and 90 days in 2018). Th is could be caused by several reasons. Although the investigation of these reasons is not the goal of this paper, we assumed that this matter may to a certain extent be caused by the number of employees working under the supervisory authorities in each country. Th e shorter process length in the Czech Republic would be understandable if the average number of decisions per employee was lower in the Czech Republic and therefore they could process the complaints faster. However, this assumption was not confi rmed, since these numbers were roughly the same in both countries (see Table 5 ). While the average number of decisions per employee in the Czech Republic was in fact lower in 2017, the same does not apply to 2018. Th us, there must be other matters causing the longer time of the review process in Slovakia. When we look separately at the length of outsourced and non-outsourced reviews, we cannot draw a consistent conclusion. While the non-outsourced reviews took shorter time in both years under review in the Czech Republic, the results are inconclusive for Slovakia. Even though one of our hypotheses was that the use of an external law fi rm leads to a shorter review period, it is not surprising that the outsourced reviews took longer. Th e use of an external fi rm means additional activities and costs on the contractor side, such as transfer of documents, study and preparation of the case. Moreover, the non-outsourced cases are dominantly represented by big cities, hospitals, ministries, public enterprises with important market power, all of which are represented by their own employees (law specialists). We can see that the number of "successful" disputes for a procuring authority was higher, regardless of whether the review process was outsourced or not (except for the year 2018 in the Czech Republic). However, the share of the lost cases was higher in the case of non-outsourced reviews (this phenomenon is especially pronounced in Slovakia). Th us, it seems like the use of an external law fi rm by a procuring authority does in fact lead to a higher success rate of disputes for a procurer. 
Number of reviews
Lost the dispute Won the dispute Note: "Won the dispute" means that the supervisory authority decided in favour of the procuring authority; "lost the dispute" means that the supervisory authority decided in favour of the proposer Source: authors.
Even though it is not possible to compare the review process of Slovakia and the Czech Republic from the point of view of the proposer, since the data is not available for Slovakia, we decided to have a separate look at the outcomes of the review process from the point of view of the proposer in the Czech Republic, based on whether the proposer used an external law fi rm or not.
Our results suggest that the use of an external law fi rm by a proposer does not lead to a signifi cantly higher rate of successful disputes for a proposer. Th e share of the reviews that the proposer won was lower in cases when the proposer decided to use an external fi rm (46 % in 2017 and 48 % in 2018) than when the proposer did not use external services (47 % in 2018 and 58 % in 2018) . According to our research, the cases that were not outsourced by the proposer are usually for bigger companies that have their own well trained law specialists. Note: "Won the dispute" means that the supervisory authority decided in favour of the proposer; "lost the dispute" means that the supervisory authority decided in favour of the procuring authority Source: authors. Based on our results, we also decided to examine the share of procuring authorities that decided to use the services of an external law fi rm in the process of a public procurement tender itself. We evaluated this on the sample of public procurements which the decisions were made on in 2017 and 2018, thus using the same sample as in the previous analysis. It is clear that the procuring authorities use services of external law fi rms much more oft en in the process of public procurement tendering than in the process of public procurement review. Th is is especially pronounced in Slovakia, where procuring authorities used outsourcing of the review process only when they also outsourced the public procurement itself. Overall, they used the option to outsource the public procurement in over 70 cases in both years under review while they only used outsourcing of the review process in over 30 cases. Our results suggest that procuring authorities use the external law fi rms more oft en in the process of public procurement tendering.
Conclusions
Th e use of external law fi rms by procuring authorities and proposers in the public procurement review process is a costly activity. Th us, this strategy must bring both interested parties certain benefi ts for it to be effi cient. Th e paper focused on the use of external law services by procuring authorities and proposers in Slovakia and the Czech Republic in 2017 and 2018 and its impact on the outcome and length of the review process.
Two hypotheses were tested within the paper, one regarding the impact of outsourcing on the length of the review process and one regarding the impact of outsourcing on the outcome of the dispute. Our results suggest that while the use of an external law fi rm may increase the success rate of reviews in favour of the procuring authority, the same does not apply to proposers. Th us, it seems to be more rational for procuring authorities to use the services of external law fi rms than it is for proposers. Our research also shows that while the outsourced reviews took longer than the non-outsourced ones in the Czech Republic, the results for Slovakia were inconclusive. However, one of the important fi ndings was that the average length of the review process (regardless of whether it was outsourced or not) is shorter in the Czech Republic than it is in Slovakia. Th e examination of causes that could explain this discrepancy was not the aim of this paper. However, we believe that this is an interesting issue that could be a topic of further research.
